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THE ERROR OF KIM V. LEE AND EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION: WHY BIFURCATING LIEN PRIORITIES
IS A BETTER REMEDY
Brad A. Goergen
Abstract: Normally, the priority of an interest in real property is determined according to
the date when the interest was recorded in the Recorder's Office of the county in which the
property is located. The first interest recorded has first priority. When an interest is satisfied,
junior interests are elevated to the next priority level. If a landowner is forced to sell the
property to satisfy a debt through foreclosure, the priority of interests determines the order for
distributing sale proceeds. Equitable subrogation is a remedy whereby a court gives a
subsequent interest holder priority over a prior recorded interest because the subsequent
interest replaces a senior lien. This leap in priority may effectively deny the intervening lienor
the opportunity to foreclose and be paid for the lien. When a court decides whether or not to
apply equitable subrogation, it is forced to apply an all-or-nothing remedy when better
alternatives exist. In Kim v. Lee, the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the
Restatement (Third) of Property's rule for applying equitable subrogation but failed to apply
the accompanying remedy of bifurcation. This Note argues that the Washington Supreme
Court should have bifurcated the lien priorities of the refinance lender and intervening lienor.
This Note concludes that bifurcation is a superior remedy because it strikes the appropriate
balance between the legal framework that determines lien priority and the need for equitable
remedies.
Normally, recording laws establish priority for liens' on property
based on the date the lien was recorded.2 In contrast, courts apply
equitable subrogation3 as a remedy to alter the priority of property
interests determined by recording laws. Courts justify equitable
subrogation in the mortgage context because it protects the refinance
lender's justified expectation of a first priority lien.4
To illustrate how equitable subrogation works, suppose Eric purchases
a house by borrowing money from Bank A.5 Shortly thereafter, while
Eric is out one night, he negligently drives through a cornfield and
destroys the crop of a local farmer, Mark. This crop is Mark's only
1. A lien is "[a] legal right or interest that a creditor has in another's property, lasting.., until a
debt or duty that it secures is satisfied." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (7th ed. 1999). A
"lienholder," or "lienor," refers to "a person having or owning a lien." Id. at 936.
2. For the purposes of this Note, the word "property" refers to real property only.
3. Subrogation is defined as the "substitution of one party for another whose debt the party pays,
entitling the paying party to rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the
debtor." BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. Hypothetical created by the author.
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source of income. Mark sues Eric and a court determines that Eric owes
Mark $50,000 for the damaged crop. Eric has no money or personal
property of value to repay Mark for the damage he caused. Mark takes
advantage of judgment lien laws and records a lien against Eric's home
to ensure that Eric will pay him. Eric subsequently decides to refinance
his home, worth $150,000, because interest rates have dropped and he is
struggling financially.
As with most lenders, Bank B will not loan money to buy a house
unless it can protect its interest against others with interests in the same
property. To protect itself, Bank B has a title insurance company search
property records to find out if anyone else has an interest in Eric's house.
The title company negligently fails to discover Mark's interest. Based on
the inaccurate information showing no other interests in Eric's house,
Bank B loans Eric $150,000 for a thirty-year term at eight percent
interest. Eric uses the money to pay off the loan from Bank A, which had
an outstanding balance of $145,000, an interest rate of nine percent, and
a fifteen-year term. The additional five thousand dollars of principal on
the loan from Bank B represents fees related to refinancing.
The only way for Mark to collect his judgment is to foreclose on
Eric's house. However, if a court applies the doctrine of equitable
subrogation, Mark may not be able to foreclose because his interest will
be subordinated to Bank B's interest.6 The court may apply equitable
subrogation because Bank B has a claim to a first priority lien for
$150,000, plus interest. Mark also has a claim to a first priority lien for
$50,000, the value of his judgment. Because equitable subrogation puts
Mark in a subordinate position and judgment liens are only allowed to
exist for a limited time, foreclosure may no longer be an option for
Mark.8 Mark may never be compensated for his damages.
6. In Kim v. Lee, the court said:
Where a lender has advanced money for the purpose of discharging a prior encumbrance in
reliance upon obtaining security equivalent to the discharged lien, and his money is so used, the
majority and preferable rule is that if he did so in ignorance of junior liens or other interests he
will be subrogated to the prior lien. Although stressed in some cases as an objection to relief,
neither negligence nor constructive notice should be material.
Kim v. Lee, 102 Wn. App. 586, 592-93, 9 P.3d 245, 250 (2000) (citing G.E. Capital Mortgage
Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170 (1995)), rev'd, 145 Wash. 2d 79,31 P.3d 665 (2001).
7. Post-judgment interest may also be awarded pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110 (2000).
8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text for an explanation of time limits on judgment liens.
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As an alternative to equitable subrogation, courts could bifurcate the
priority of the competing interests? Bifurcation creates an outcome that
protects the competing interests of both parties by allowing the
intervening lienor to have first priority to the extent necessary to put him
in the same position he was in before the refinance transaction occurred.
Bifurcation would allow Bank B to assume a first priority lien against
Eric's house but only to the extent allowed by the original terms of Bank
A's mortgage plus new more favorable terms. Mark would have priority
to the extent Bank B's new terms prejudiced his judgment lien and any
remaining interest of Bank B under the new loan terms would be
subordinate to Mark's lien.
Several authorities have recognized the value of bifurcating lien
priorities. California bifurcates priorities in some cases and at least one
other court has recently applied this approach in the mortgage context. °
This remedy is also recommended by the Restatement (Third) of
Property."
The Washington Supreme Court failed to apply bifurcation when it
decided Kim v. Lee. 2 The court decided that the remedy of equitable
subrogation was not available to protect a title insurer from liability
when the title insurer had actual knowledge of an intervening lien before
the refinance transaction but failed to disclose that fact. 3 The court went
on to adopt the Restatement's view that equitable subrogation is
available to the extent that new lien terms do not prejudice junior
lienors. 4 Rather than bifurcating priority between the refinance lender
9. While many states have examined the issue of equitable subrogation, courts have taken
substantially different approaches. The range of approaches extends from a rather favorable view of
equitable subrogation in the mortgage context to an almost complete prohibition on its applicability.
See infra Part I. Equitable subrogation in the mortgage context was a matter of first impression for
the Washington State Supreme Court- Kim v. Lee, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 88, 31 P.3d 665, 669 (2001).
10. See Lennar Northeast Partners v. Tahoe Vista Inn & Marina, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 442-43
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (bifurcating lien priorities when first lienor substantially altered terms of loan);
Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 734 N.E.2d 493, 501 (I1. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying bifurcation to refinance lender and intervening judgment creditor but only when refinance
lien was filed before original lien was released).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, § 7.6 and cmt. e, illus. 28 (1997)
(hereinafter Restatement).
12. 145 Wash. 2d 79, 31 P.3d 665 (2001).
13. Id. at 82, 31 P.3d at 666-67.
14. Id. at 89, 31 P.3d at 670.
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and the intervening lienor,5 the court found some of the refinance terms
to be prejudicial and reinstated the trial court's decision allowing the
intervening lienor to step into first priority and foreclose." Under the
Restatement, bifurcation is recommended when new lien terms prejudice
the intervening lienor.
17
This Note argues that the Washington Supreme Court applied the
wrong remedy in Kim given the court's adoption of the Restatement's
rule for equitable subrogation. Part I discusses property law as it applies
to the mortgage context, starting with the creation of a lien and ending
with foreclosure and the distribution of proceeds. Part II looks at how
courts approach the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Part III analyzes
bifurcation as an alternative to equitable subrogation. Part IV discusses
Kim v. Lee and Washington's approach to equitable subrogation. Finally,
Part V argues that Washington should adopt bifurcation and reject
equitable subrogation because bifurcation respects the existence of
recording laws and best serves the interests of equity.
I. LIENS, MORTGAGES, AND PROPERTY LAW RELATED TO
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION AND BIFURCATION
In order to understand equitable subrogation and bifurcated lien
priorities, it is first necessary to look at how property secures financial
obligations. Once property is owned, it may be burdened by liens that
reflect the different interests in that particular piece of property. The
mechanics of recording laws play an important part in establishing who
has an interest in property and, when multiple parties have interests, how
those interests relate to one another. The relationships between multiple
interests are important because they create a hierarchy of priority, and
this priority affects how courts treat the interests in a foreclosure action.
Statutes control the foreclosure process with specific provisions applying
15. For the purposes of consistency, this Note will use the term "refinance lender" to refer to the
party requesting first priority through equitable subrogation. The party might not in fact be a bank or
commercial lender and cases cited in this Note may use different terminology. Similarly, this Note
uses the term 'judgment creditor" and "intervening lienor" to refer to the party that has an
intervening interest. A judgment creditor is a "person having a legal right to enforce execution of a
judgment for a specific sum of money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (7th ed. 1999). However,
the nature of the parties does not affect the appropriateness of bifurcation. Courts can beneficially
apply bifurcation instead of equitable subrogation whenever a priority dispute exists between a
subsequent party that refinances senior liens and an intervening lienor.
16. Kim, 145 Wash. 2d at 93, 31 P.3d at 671-72.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, § 7.6 cmt. e and illus. 28 (1997).
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to judgment creditors who participate in a foreclosure. At the end of this
chain of issues, courts may apply equitable subrogation, resulting in a
different ordering of lien priorities. Bifurcating lien priorities produces
yet another result that differs from equitable subrogation in significant
ways.
A. How Liens Affect Property
Property ownership is rarely absolute. For example, the fee simple
owner of property has the right to diminish the absolute nature of his
ownership by granting liens against the property. 8 Liens represent the
right of the lien holder to use the property as security for a debt. 9 Liens
may be either consensual or nonconsensual." A mortgage is a type of
consensual lien and modem mortgages are frequently insured to protect
the lender. A judgment lien is a type of nonconsensual lien and it
provides a way for judgment creditors to collect their judgments.
A common type of consensual lien is the home mortgage. A mortgage
is considered a consensual lien because the landowner willingly grants
the mortgage interest.21 A mortgage is a transaction in which a lender
loans money to someone in exchange for a lien against the property.'
Such loans are composed of three general elements: (1) the amount of
the loan, or "principal," (2) the interest rate, and (3) the length of the
repayment period, or "term," of the loan.' Loan repayments are
structured so that at the end of the term, all of the principal will have
been repaid.24 Each individual payment is used to pay down part of the
principal and to pay the interest that has accrued since the last payment.
This payment structure is called "amortization" and results in early loan
18. See generally WILLIAM STOEBUCK, REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW, in 17 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE § 1.3 (1995).
19. MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER, CREDITORS' REMEDIES-DEBTORS' RELIEF, in 27
WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 4.1, at 309 (1998).
20. WILLIAM STOEBUCK, REAL ESTATE: TRANSACTIONS, in 18 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 16.3,
at 226-27 (1995).
21. Id. § 16.3,at227.
22. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.1, at 1-2 (3d
ed. 1994); see also infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing purchase money security
interests (PMSI's)).
23. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 1.1, at 2-3.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1.1,at2.
239
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payments being primarily used to pay interest.26 Over time, the amount of
each payment used to pay down the principal increases and the amount
of interest accruing decreases.27 At the end of the term of the loan, when
all of the principal and interest have been paid, the mortgage is
extinguished and the lender's lien against the property is removed.28
After a mortgage is created, homeowners frequently purchase
mortgage insurance for the benefit of the lender. 9 Mortgage insurance
protects lenders from losses resulting from a default by the homeowner.30
Because many mortgages are later sold on the secondary mortgage
market, mortgage insurers and secondary market investors like the
Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") have an interest
in stability and predictability in the issuance of mortgages and the
adjudication of lien disputes."
In contrast, a judgment lien is an example of a nonconsensual lien.32 A
judgment lien is the result of a court entering a judgment in favor of the
judgment creditor as part of a legal action. By statute, a judgment
creditor may attach a lien in the amount of the judgment to all of the real
property owned or thereafter acquired by the landowner.33 The
introductory hypothetical illustrates how a judgment lien may arise. If
Mark wins a lawsuit against Eric for the damage to the corn field, a court
will enter a judgment in favor of Mark for the value of the damage.
Assuming Mark complies with the statutes covering recording of
judgment liens,34 Mark can take a lien against Eric's property for the
value of the judgment entered in Mark's favor by the court. The
judgment lien can be satisfied if Eric pays Mark or if Mark forecloses
and the foreclosure sale proceeds are sufficient to pay off Eric's debt.35
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 17.26, at 320. Removal of the lender's lien is not automatic.
If the lender does not voluntarily remove the lien, the property owner could have it removed by a
court. Id. § 17.26, at 320-21.
29. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 11.2, at 773.
30. See id.
31. See generally id. at § 11.2.
32. ROMBAUER, supra note 19, § 4.1, at 309.
33. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.190 (2000).
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. If property subject to foreclosure is homestead property, the foreclosure must comply with the
requirements of Chapter 6.13 of the Revised Code of Washington. Specifically, homestead property
must have net equity before a creditor can foreclose. See WASH. REv. CODE § 6.13.090. Practically
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B. Recording Laws and Their Role in Fixing the Rights of Those with
an Interest in Property
Property records are the basis upon which courts determine priority
for interests in property. However, recording laws require different
procedures for recording different types of liens. Priority is generally
determined by the date an interest in property is created36 and recording
that interest creates notice, which is an important concept in property
law.37 Washington modifies this general rule by statute and in some
limited cases, recording laws give preference to purchase money
mortgages in priority disputes."
Recording laws allow people with interests in land to protect those
interests.39 Interests in property are recorded separately for each county
by a county official responsible for keeping the records in an accurate
and organized fashion. ° Recording laws and the resulting property
records are used to regulate how multiple interests in the same property
relate to one another. Recording an interest in property protects the
interest by giving subsequent interest holders notice that another interest
exists.
The common law rule regarding interests in property gives the highest
priority to the first interest created." This rule is commonly referred to as
"first in time, first in right."42 This rule gives priority to previously
recorded liens over subsequently recorded liens, which are referred to as
junior liens.43 Subsequent liens are subordinated in part due to notice.
speaking, any creditor foreclosing on property, homestead or not, would want there to be sufficient
equity to pay off the lien in default or foreclosure may not be worth the time and cost.
36. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 98.
37. See, e.g., id. at 97-100 (discussing, inter alia, the concept of notice).
38. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
39. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.1, at 82-83.
40. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 65.08.070, .160. Title insurance companies use official county records
to develop their own databases of property records. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.6, at 140.
Generally, potential lienors will hire title insurance companies to determine what interests affect a
particular piece of property before any transactions relating to the property are finalized. See id. at
141-42. Many lenders may only loan money if they can take a first priority lien, due in part to
banking regulations and due in part to the need for adequate security. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 22, § 8.18, at 683. Ifproperly done, the title insurance company's search will reveal all interests
relating to a particular piece of property. See STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.17, at 145-46.
Arguably, if an interest is missed, the title insurance company is negligent. See infra Part II.C.
41. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 98.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 1.1, at 5.
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Washington and many other states alter the common law rule through
a recording statute." Washington's recording statute creates a "race-
notice" system.45 The race-notice system allows a person recording an
interest to take priority over someone with a senior interest only when
four conditions are met.46 Those four conditions are: (1) the junior
interest is created before the senior interest is recorded, (2) the junior
party has no notice of the senior party's interest, (3) the junior party
gives value for his interest, and (4) the junior interest is recorded before
the senior interest is recorded.47 When a party meets these conditions, the
race-notice statute will elevate the priority of a subsequent lien holder
over that of a prior lien holder.48 When a party cannot meet these
conditions, the "race" portion of the Washington statute gives priority to
the first interest holder to record.49
Property records create notice to others that interests already exist in a
piece of property. The importance of recording interests in property
cannot be overstated because prior recorded interests are said to give
notice to subsequent interest holders such that the subsequent interest
holder cannot obtain priority over the previously recorded claim.5
Anyone who obtains an interest in property is charged with having
knowledge of prior recorded interests, even if the party does not have
actual knowledge of the prior interests." This knowledge is considered
constructive notice." A party with constructive notice of prior claims is
ineligible to claim bona fide purchaser status and that status is a necessity
to claim priority over a prior recorded interest under Washington's race-
notice recording laws. 3 Because constructive notice defeats the bona fide
purchaser status, a subsequent interest holder cannot gain priority over a
44. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 99.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.070.
46. Id.; see also STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 100.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.070; see also STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 100.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.070; see also STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.5, at 100.
49. WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.070; see also STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 13.8, at 112.
50. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 17.21, at 310.
51. See id. § 13.6, at 103.
52. See id. § 17.21,at310.
53. Id. § 13.8, at 112. A bona fide purchaser is a good faith purchaser for value who does not have
actual or constructive notice of other interests in the thing being sold. See Tomlinson v. Clarke, 118
Wash. 2d 498, 500, 825 P.2d 706, 707 (1992); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (7th ed.
1999) (defining a bona fide purchaser as one "who buys something for value without notice of
another's claim to the item or of any defects in the seller's title").
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previously recorded interesti 4 The resulting rule is that the first recorded
interest has priority over subsequently recorded interests."5
A judgment creditor-a specific type of lienor-can record a
judgment lien to preserve a lien's priority. Under Washington statutes, a
judgment lien attaches to all of the property a judgment debtor owns or
later acquires. 6 In order for a judgment lien to attach to property, the
judgment creditor must record the judgment with the county official in
the county in which the property is located. 7 For property in the county
where the judgment was rendered, judgment liens are given priority
based on the date of the judgment. 8 For property outside of that county,
the priority is based on the date when the judgment creditor records a
certified abstract of the judgment in the county where the property is
located. 9 Thus, for property located in the same county as where the
judgment was rendered, filing the judgment attaches the lien to the
property and establishes priority. For property located elsewhere, filing
an abstract establishes the priority date but filing the judgment is still
required to attach the judgment to the property.
Beyond recording statutes, courts accord purchase money security
interests (PMSI) special status in determining priority.6" A PMSI is
created when a lender loans funds to a buyer so that the buyer can
purchase property, the buyer uses the funds for that purpose, and the
lender receives a security interest in that property.6 The resulting
mortgage is called a PMSI because the lender's security interest in the
property, represented by the mortgage, represents the money used to
purchase the property. 2 The fact that a lender gave money for the
purpose of buying property is considered to create a special relationship
between the lender and the property. 3 This special relationship justifies
54. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 17.21, at 309-10.
55. Id. at 309.
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.190 (2000).
57. Id. § 6.13.090.
58. Id. § 4.56.200.
59. Id.
60. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 9.1, at 695-96.
61. Id. § 9.1, at 695.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 698-700.
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giving priority to a PMSI over other claims granted by the purchaser to
the extent that loan proceeds are used to purchase the property.'
C. The Foreclosure Process and Judgment Creditors
After recording statutes and property records establish interests in
property, interest holders may foreclose to protect those interests.
Washington specifically controls a judgment creditor's foreclosure by
statute. The statutory limitations on how long a judgment lien may last
are an important consideration for the judgment creditor.
A lienor may initiate the foreclosure process to remedy a default by
the landowner.65 A default occurs when the landowner fails to perform
the obligation created by the mortgage or lien.6 Studies have shown that
the likelihood of default is related to the amount of the homeowner's
equity.67 As a homeowner's equity increases, the likelihood of default
decreases. 8
In general terms, foreclosure is a process in which property is sold and
the proceeds of the sale are applied to satisfy the liens against the
property.69 When property is subject to multiple liens, foreclosure sale
proceeds are used to pay off the liens according to priority.7" If any funds
remain after all liens have been extinguished, the excess proceeds go to
the landowner." Normally, the chronological order in which the lien
64. Id. at 696 n.4; see also 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (1994) (allowing for a deduction from gross
income for interest relating to acquisition indebtedness of a qualified residence). Acquisition
indebtedness is "any indebtedness which is incurred in acquiring... any qualified residence" and
expressly includes "any indebtedness ... resulting from the refinancing of indebtedness ... " 26
U.S.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i). This definition supports the idea that refinanced money retains the quality
of a PMSI. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 62A.9A.324 (West 2001) (providing priority to a
perfected PMSI in personal property when a dispute exists), .334 (giving a PMSI in fixtures priority
over a conflicting interest in the related real property).
65. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 1.1, at 4. While the lienor may have alternatives to
judicial foreclosure, such as non-judicial foreclosure, the applicability of bifurcation to those
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Note.
66. d.§ 2.1
67. Id. § 11.2, at 772-73. Homeowner equity can be expressed as a ratio of loan amount to
property value (often referred to as "loan-to-value ratio"). d. at 772.
68. See id.
69. Id. § 1.1,at 5.
70. Id. at 4-5.
71. Id. It is also important to note that homestead exemptions are a key component in determining
if a foreclosure is permissible and how proceeds will be distributed after foreclosure. See, e-g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.13.170 (2000). However, a discussion of homestead exemptions is not
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holders recorded their interests with the county auditor, subject to
additional statutory requirements, determines the priority of liens.7'
Washington law requires judgment creditors to collect on liens against
property within ten years.73 A judgment creditor can begin the
foreclosure process by filing an affidavit stating, inter alia, that the
property owner has no personal assets to satisfy the judgment lien.74
After filing the affidavit, the judgment creditor must get a writ of
execution.75 The writ of execution is an order from the issuing court to
the sheriff of the county in which the property is located directing the
sheriff to sell the property.76 After the sheriff conducts the sale, the
proceeds from the sale are distributed to the interest holders.77
D. The Effects of Equitable Subrogation and Bifurcation on the
Distribution of Foreclosure Proceeds
Proceeds from a foreclosure are generally distributed according to lien
priority as determined by recording statutes. When courts apply equitable
subrogation, they apply a new priority system based on equitable
principles. In contrast, bifurcating priorities produces a result different
from that of both recording statutes and equitable subrogation. The
outcome produced by bifurcation offers some of the protection of
recording statutes and also addresses the policies behind equitable
subrogation.
Generally, proceeds are distributed according to lien priority.78 Under
the normal lien priority system, a judgment creditor would be first in
priority when an original mortgage was refinanced. The release of this
first priority mortgage would allow the second priority judgment creditor
to assume first priority while the refinance lender would take second
necessary for the purposes of this Note. Bifurcating lien priorities is completely compatible with
homestead exemptions.
72. See WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.070; see also supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020. The judgment creditor may extend the period for another ten
years by petitioning the court that rendered the judgment within ninety days of the end of the first
ten-year period. Id.
74. See id.
75. MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER, CREDITORS' REMEDIES-DEBTORS' RELIEF, in 28
WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 7.30, at 111 (1998).
76. See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.140.
77. RomBAUER, supra note 75, § 7.30, at 112.
78. STOEBUCK, supra note 20, § 17.31, at 308.
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priority. As a first priority lienor, the judgment creditor would be able to
establish the necessary net equity to proceed with foreclosure.
If a court applies equitable subrogation after a judgment creditor
initiates foreclosure, it alters lien priorities and the foreclosure sale may
be stopped. Applying equitable subrogation puts the judgment creditor
back into second priority and allows the refinance lender to take first
priority based on the notion that the refinance lender had an expectation
of first priority, notwithstanding recording laws to the contrary. This
change in priority may leave the judgment creditor without sufficient net
equity to move forward with foreclosure.79 Even more detrimental to the
judgment creditor, the new loan may increase the risk of default due to
changes in the loan-to-value ratio and increase the time the judgment
creditor must wait to foreclose. When courts apply equitable subrogation,
lien priority is abandoned as the determinant of how competing interests
in property relate to each other.
If a court applies bifurcation, the judgment creditor's foreclosure
action may still be stopped, but any new prejudicial loan terms will not
compromise the judgment creditor's priority. Bifurcation allows the
refinance lender to step into first priority, but only to the extent of the
original loan terms plus more favorable terms."0 If the new terms work
any disadvantage to the judgment creditor, the judgment creditor has first
priority as to changes in terms that are prejudicial and remains in second
priority with respect to the original terms.8' The refinance lender would
have junior priority compared to the judgment creditor with respect to
any amounts under the new loan that prejudice the judgment creditor.
Thus, under this approach, a judgment creditor's foreclosure may still be
postponed, but the judgment lien would only be junior to a loan no more
prejudicial than the one in place before the refinance transaction.
79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.13.010.
80. Bifurcation is consistent with a notion of landlord-tenant law in which a tenant only remains
secondarily liable to the landlord for the terms originally negotiated when the tenant assigns a lease
to an assignee. STOEBUCK, supra note 18, § 6.64, at 399 n.7. If the landlord and assignee negotiate
terms more favorable to the tenant, the landlord is considered to have released the tenant to the
extent of the more favorable terms. See id.
81. The three primary changes to loan terms are an increase in principal, an increase in the interest




II. MANY COURTS RECOGNIZE EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
BUT APPLY IT IN DIFFERENT WAYS
Courts generally recognize equitable subrogation as a potential
remedy in the mortgage context.82 The doctrine is widely understood to
amount "to an assignment by operation of law of the original creditor's
position to the [refinance lender]."83 Equitable subrogation is based on a
few basic equitable principles, yet courts do not uniformly apply the
remedy because of differences in how notice and negligence are treated.
82. Many courts have dealt with the issue of equitable subrogation in the mortgage context. See,
&g., Ex parte AmSouth Mortgage Co., 679 So. 2d 251, 253 (Ala. 1996); Rush v. Alaska Mortgage
Group, 937 P.2d 647, 648 (Alaska 1997); Herberman v. Bergstrom, 816 P.2d 244,247 (Ariz. 1991);
Newberry v. Scruggs, 986 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Ark. 1999); Lennar N.E. Partners v. Tahoe Vista Inn &
Marina, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435,437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Rosenblit v. Williams, 750 A.2d 1131, 1133
(Conn. 2000); Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat'l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Bryant v. Cole, 468 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (Ga. 1996); Hoopes v. Hoopes, 861 P.2d 88, 91
(Idaho 1993); Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 734 N.E. 2d 493,497 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000); Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P'ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct App.
2001); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Rupe, 283 N.W. 108, 108-09 (Iowa 1938); Levant State Bank
v. Shults, 47 P.2d 80, 81 (Kan. 1935); Ranier v. Mount Sterling Nat'l Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154, 157
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (Ky. 1991); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins.
Co., 194 So. 2d 164, 168 (La. Ct. App. 1966); United Carolina Bank v. Beesley, 663 A.2d 574, 576
(Me. 1995); Waicker v. Banegura, 745 A.2d 419, 423 (Md. 2000); E. Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan,
701 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Mass. 1998); Carl H. Peterson Co. v. Zero Estates, 261 N.W.2d 346, 347-48
(Minn. 1978); Equity Servs. Co. v. Hamilton, 257 So. 2d 201,203 (Miss. 1972); Metmor Fin. Inc. v.
Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Mo. 1998); First Fidelity Bank v. Travelers Mortgage Servs.
Inc., 693 A.2d 525, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Roth v. Porush, 722 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); First Union Nat'l Bank of N.C. v. Lindley Labs Inc., 510 S.E.2d 187, 188
(N.C. CL App. 1999); Leppo, Inc. v. Kiefer, Nos. 20097, 20105, 2001 WL 81262, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 31, 2001) (unpublished opinion); King v. Towe, 996 P.2d 948, 949 n.1 (Okla. Civ. App.
1999); Dimeo v. Gesik, 993 P.2d 183, 184 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Langehans v. Smith, No. 3343, 2001
WL 1154161, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. May 21, 2001) (opinion withdrawn for procedural reasons at 554
S.E.2d 681, 682 (2001)); Almany v. Christie, No. 94C-83, 1997 WL 71801, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 21, 1997) (unpublished opinion); Baccus v. Westgate Mgmt. Corp., 981 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1998); Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kim v.
Lee, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 31 P.3d 665, 669 (2001); Pierner v. Computer Res. & Tech., Inc., 577
N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion); Gaub v. Simpson, 866 P.2d 765, 767
(Wyo. 1993).
83. NELSON &WHTMAN, supra note 22, §10.1, at 737-38.
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A. Courts Agree on the Principles Behind Equitable Subrogation, but
Vary as to Its General Applicability
Courts apply equitable subrogation in the mortgage context primarily
to solve priority disputes arising from refinance transactions.84 The
doctrine is an equitable remedy and as such, courts apply it according to
equitable principles. Because courts have discretion in applying equitable
remedies,85 jurisdictions apply equitable subrogation differently. While
some courts apply it sparingly, others apply it more liberally.
The common factual scenario that raises a request for equitable
subrogation involves a refinancing transaction.16 Essentially, a new party
pays off a first priority lien and expects to assume the priority of that
lien.87 A priority dispute arises when an intervening lienor, junior to the
original lien but senior to the new lender, seeks an elevation in priority
due to the extinguishment of the original lien.88
Equitable subrogation is designed to prevent unjust enrichment. 89
When a refinance lender's priority is in doubt due to an intervening lien,
courts apply the doctrine based on the refinance lender's justified
expectation of receiving security.9" Courts assume this expectation is
justified because most lenders will not loan funds secured by a home
unless they obtain a lien with enough priority to protect the lender in the
event of default.91 However, because the doctrine is an equitable one, a
court will not apply equitable subrogation if it will prejudice a party.92
Courts only use equitable subrogation when it will produce an equitable
outcome that does not result in an injustice to the rights of a party with
84. Equitable subrogation in the mortgage context is distinguishable from equitable subrogation in
the insurance context. In the insurance context, "[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine that allows
the insurer to recover from the negligent third party the amount that it has paid to its insured." W.
Wash. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 102 Wn. App. 488, 507, 7 P.3d 861, 871
(2000).
85. See ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 11-12
(5th ed. 1994).
86. See, e.g., Aames Capital Corp., 734 N.E.2d at 495.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 10.1, at 737-38.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, § 7.6 (1997).
91. See supra note 40.
92. See, e.g., Langehans v. Smith, No. 3343, 2001 WL 533203, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. May 21,
2001) (noting that equitable subrogation cannot be applied when it will work an injustice or inequity
on another party), revised at 554 S.E.2d 681, 682 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
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equal or superior equities.93 Courts may determine the equities of each
party by analyzing issues such as notice, negligence, or other equitable
factors.94 Occasionally, courts refer to this process as weighing or
balancing the equities of each party.9
While most states that have addressed equitable subrogation in the
mortgage context analyze the same issues, jurisdictions still apply the
doctrine with considerable variation.96 Missouri, for example, only
allows equitable subrogation in extreme cases bordering on or reaching
fraud.97 The remedy is reserved to such extreme cases because, according
to the Missouri Supreme Court, courts of equity should be loath to
interfere with the legal rights of those who are without fault,98 such as an
intervening judgment creditor. Other courts differ over whether it is
worse to grant a windfall to refinance lenders by elevating their lien
priority despite recording statutes requiring a different outcome, or to
grant a windfall to intervening lienors by elevating the priority of
intervening liens due to a title search error.99
A court that balances the equities of each party is confined to the
circumstances of each case."' This reliance on circumstances specific to
each situation makes it difficult to develop a generally applicable rule for
the equities necessary for application of equitable subrogation. This lack
of consistency also makes it difficult to predict how a court will resolve a
priority dispute of this type under the all-or-nothing nature of equitable
subrogation, in which one party takes complete priority over the other
party.
93. Coy v. Raabe, 69 Wash. 2d 346, 350-51,418 P.2d 728, 731 (1966).
94. See Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P'ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (noting that subrogation depends on the equities and attending facts and discussing
negligence and notice).
95. See, e.g., Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
96. See supra note 82.
97. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454,461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id.
99. Compare Brooks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 599 So. 2d 1163, 1165-66 (Ala. 1992) (noting
that allowing the intervening lienor to gain priority over the refinance lender results in an unjust
windfall for the intervening lienor), with Osterman, 714 N.W.2d at 739 (noting that allowing
intervening lienor to gain priority over refinance lender does not result in an unjust windfall for
intervening lienor).
100. Coy v. Raabe, 69 Wash. 2d 346, 350-51, 418 P.2d 728, 731 (1966); see also Wilshire
Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P'ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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B. Courts Differ as to the Effects of Actual and Constructive Notice on
the Intervening Lien
When a refinance lender has actual knowledge of the intervening lien,
some courts have been reluctant to subrogate the new lender's lien.'
Actual knowledge results from the lender being informed that another
lien exists.10 2 The common justification for actual knowledge barring
equitable subrogation is that a lender who extends a new loan with actual
knowledge of an intervening lien must not have intended to take a senior
priority position. 3 Other courts have allowed equitable subrogation even
when the refinance lender had actual knowledge,"° reasoning that the
refinance lender should receive first priority absent a showing: (1) that
the intervening lienor detrimentally relied on the release of the original
lien; (2) that paramount equities exist in favor of the judgment creditor;
or (3) that the refinance lender expressed an intent to subordinate.' 5
When a refinance lender has constructive notice, as when the
intervening lien has been recorded but a title search misses its existence,
courts differ as to whether the notice bars equitable subrogation. 6
Support for constructive notice barring equitable subrogation lies in the
idea that the refinance lender can discover a properly recorded
intervening lien; therefore, responsibility for the failure to fird that lien
lies with the refinance lender.0 7 When the priority problem has been
created by someone other than the intervening lienor, such as a negligent
title insurer, some courts view the equities as favoring the loss being
borne by someone other than the innocent intervening judgment
creditor.' Courts that do not hold constructive notice to bar equitable
subrogation justify application of the doctrine as preventing a windfall to
the intervening judgment creditor, who would be elevated in priority due
101. See, e.g., Osterman, 714 N.E.2d at 738-39.
102. See id. at 737-38 (explaining how the refinance lender developed actual knowledge).
103. Id. at 739.
104. Rush v. Alaska Mortgage Group, 937 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1997).
105. Id.
106. Compare Dedes v. Strickland, 414 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (S.C. 1992) (upholding lower court's
decision to deny refinance lender's claim for equitable subrogation when lender had constructive
notice), with Rush, 937 P.2d at 651(excluding any consideration of constructive notice from
equitable subrogation analysis).
107. Landmark Bank v. J.V. Ciaravino, 752 S.W.2d 923, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
108. Metmor Fin. Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454,462 (Mo. 1998).
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to parties releasing the senior lien without knowledge of the intervening
lien. 09
C. Courts Differ as to How Negligence Affects the Application of
Equitable Subrogation
Negligence is an important component of equitable subrogation
analysis. The priority dispute between the refinance lender and
intervening lienor may arise in part because a title insurance company
failed to find the intervening lien during the title search. Missing a
recorded lien implies negligence. However, courts differ as to how
negligence should affect equitable subrogation. Both the level of
negligence and the sophistication of the parties involved may affect the
outcome.
The issue of negligence is closely related to, but different from, the
issue of constructive notice. In many cases, the reason the refinance
lender has constructive notice of the intervening lien rather than actual
notice is that the title company or agent of the lender failed to discover
the intervening lien while conducting a title search.10 This failure may
constitute negligence. While jurisdictions differ as to the effect of
negligence,"' some courts hold that a negligent title search should not
abrogate the rights of a properly recorded intervening lien."' Other
courts allow equitable subrogation unless the refinance lender is
chargeable with culpable negligence.1 Culpable negligence, in this
context, is an act that a reasonable, prudent, and honest person would not
do, or the omission of an act that a reasonable, prudent, and honest
person would do." 4
109. See Brooks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 599 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Ala. 1992).
110. See. e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat'l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
111. Compare Suntrust Bank, 792 So. 2d at 1227 n.3 (interpreting law to allow equitable
subrogation despite a party's negligence), with Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P'ship,
743 N.E.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting law to deny refinance lender's claim
for equitable subrogation when that party negligently failed to meet reasonable standards in
searching for other liens).
112. See, e.g., Wilshire Servicing Corp., 743 N.E.2d at 1178-79.
113. See. eg., Smith v. State Savings and Loan Ass'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 298, 299 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
114. Newberry v. Scruggs, 986 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ark. 1999) (noting that title company's failure
to find judgment lien upon two searches amounts to culpable neglect); Wilshire Servicing Corp., 743
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The sophistication of a party, due to commercial expertise in the
property area, may also affect a determination of culpable negligence.
The Washington Supreme Court stated that "[i]t would be a gross
misapplication of the doctrine of subrogation were we to hold that its
cloak settles automatically upon one who has simply made a mistake,
when it is a commercial transaction involving a consideration."'' 5
Expanding on this notion, other courts have refused to allow title
companies and banks to be equitably subrogated based on their failure to
find an intervening lien because such companies are sophisticated
professionals with experience in the area of secured real property
transactions." 6 Ultimately, courts disagree as to whether missing a lien is
culpable negligence." 7
III. BIFURCATION ALLOWS COURTS TO LIMIT INEQUITABLE
RESULTS WHEN SETTLING LIEN DISPUTES
California courts have found that bifurcating priority between a senior
lienor and a junior lienor prevents inequitable results and serves both
parties' interests." 8 Bifurcating lien priorities allows two parties to share
first priority on a limited basis. This approach is consistent with the
principles behind equitable subrogation and recording laws. Further, the
Restatement suggests that bifurcation is the appropriate remedy when a
refinance loan prejudices an intervening lienor." 9
In Lennar Northeast Partners v. Tahoe Vista Inn & Marina,2 ' the
California Court of Appeals analyzed a priority dispute in which a first
N.E.2d at 1178-79 (noting that equitable subrogation will be unavailable where a party is guilty of
culpable negligence).
115. Coy v. Raabe, 69 Wash. 2d 346, 351, 418 P.2d 728, 731 (1966) (stating that a bona fide
purchaser is eligible and a title insurer is not eligible for equitable subrogation).
116. Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 738 n.4 (1999) (citing Universal Title Co. v. United
States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1991)).
117. Compare Wilshire Servicing Corp., 743 N.E.2d at 1178-79 (finding that a refinance lender's
mistake in searching for other liens is sufficiently negligent to deny the refinance lender's request for
equitable subrogation), with Smith, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (holding that failing to find a recorded lien
is not sufficiently negligent to deny the refinance lender's request for equitable subrogation).
118. While California has developed and applied this approach extensively, at least one other
state has applied bifurcation on a limited basis. See Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak
Forest, 734 N.E.2d 493,501 (111. Ct. App. 2000) (limiting refinance lender's first priority to value of
original lien at time of new lien's perfection).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, § 7.6 cmt. e and illus. 28 (1997).
120. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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priority lienor modified the terms of the related loan."' The second
priority lienor was held to have first priority by the trial court because the
new terms of the first priority loan were prejudicial to the second priority
lien."2 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in part, finding that
the first priority lienor continued to have first priority but only to the
extent of the original loan terms."z The second priority lienor had
priority over the prejudicial changes made to the first priority loan. 4
The specific facts of Lennar help illustrate how a bifurcating lien
allows two parties to share first priority to a limited extent. In Lennar,
the lender modified the first lien by extending the term, increasing the
principal, and increasing the interest rate."2 In considering the effects of
these new terms upon the respective interests of the parties, the court
noted that a senior lienor may extend the time of the loan but only if the
extension does not impair a junior lienor's rights and security. 6 The
court concluded that extending a loan term in order to prevent a default
by the property owner did not by itself create enough prejudice to alter
lien priorities." However, increases to interest or principal do create
significant prejudice to a second priority lienor.'28
The principles for deciding if a modified lien should take second
priority or receive bifurcated priority are similar to those for equitable
subrogation." 9 Bifurcated priorities are created when "the senior lien is
modified in any material manner which produces an important impact on
the value of the junior lien."' 30 In Lennar, the court noted that because it
had ordered the bifurcation of priorities, the question of equitable
subrogation need not be addressed.' Equitable subrogation, in the
court's opinion, required that the junior lienor be "left in exactly the
same junior position he had before."'3  Bifurcating priorities
121. Id. at 437.
122. Id. at 438.





128. Id. at 440.
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. Lennar N.E. Partners, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (internal quotation omitted).
131. Id. at 443.
132. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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accomplished this goal of leaving parties in the same position.' Thus,
bifurcating priorities creates an outcome without prejudice to either
party, which is exactly the outcome courts intend for equitable
subrogation to create. 34
The Restatement also recommends bifurcation for priority disputes
between intervening lienors that are prejudiced by new lien terms and
refinance lenders.'35 In highlighting that equitable subrogation is
available only when it does not materially prejudice intervening interests,
the Restatement limits a refinance lender's priority to the principal and
interest rate that controlled the original first priority lien.'36 A change in
the term of the loan by itself is prejudicial only if the change can fairly
be said to put the junior lienor in a substantially weaker position."'
Changes that are materially prejudicial limit equitable subrogation by
giving the refinance lender priority only to the extent of the terms of the
prior first priority lien.'38 The intervening lienor takes priority over the
refinance lender with respect to amounts reflected in the prejudicial
changes.13
IV. IN KIM V LEE, THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT
ADOPTED THE RESTATEMENT'S RULE FOR EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION, BUT THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE
RESTATEMENT'S REMEDY
The Washington Supreme Court considered the doctrine of equitable
subrogation in the mortgage context for the first time in Kim v. Lee. t4 °
The court adopted the Restatement rule for applying equitable
subrogation. 4 t Once having adopted that rule, the court determined that
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Langehans v. Smith, No. 3343, 2001 WL 1154161, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. May 21,
2001) (noting that equitable subrogation cannot be applied when it will work an injustice or inequity
on another party), revised at 544 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES, § 7.6 cmt. e and illus. 28 (1997).
Although the remedy is advocated in some instances, the Restatement does not use the term
"bifurcation."
136. Id. § 7.6 cmt. e.
137. Id. § 7.3 cmt. b.
138. Id. § 7.6 cmt. e, and illus. 28.
139. Id.
140. Kim v. Lee, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 88,31 P.3d 665, 669 (2001).
141. Id. at 89, 31 P.3d at 670.
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the refinance lender's new lien terms were prejudicial and held equitable
subrogation inapplicable.'42
A. The Facts and Procedural History Present Equities in Favor of
Both Parties
Kenneth and Yuk Ok Chang bought a house for their daughter and
son-in-law, Sharon and Stanley Lee, in 1995.143 The Changs paid for the
house by obtaining a first mortgage." T While the mortgage was in the
Changs' name, the Lees made the payments and occupied the home.'45 In
May of 1997, Hu Kim received a default judgment against the Lees for
$83,565.37 based on the Lees' failure to comply with a court's discovery
orders. 146 Six months later, in December of 1997, the Changs quitclaimed
a one-half interest in the home to the Lees.'4 7 The Lees sought to
refinance the home in March of 1998 and did so by paying off the
Changs' mortgage to Sterling Trust Company and taking a new first
mortgage with Pioneer National Bank.' This new refinance loan had an
interest rate of 6.75 percent per annum and the loan proceeds were used
to pay off the existing first mortgage for which the Changs were
responsible.'49 The Changs' original first mortgage had an interest rate of
10.5 percent per annum. 5° The significant differences between the two
loans were the loan term and the principal. Sterling Trust Company's
mortgage had a six-year term and was due in 2001, while the Pioneer
Bank mortgage had a 30-year term and was due in 2028.' The principal
of the loan was increased by approximately $5,557 to cover lender's
fees, title insurance, and escrow fees.'1
2
As part of the refinance transaction, Yakima Title conducted a title
search for Pioneer Bank and issued a preliminary title insurance policy in
142. Id. at 90, 93, 31 P.3d at 670, 672.
143. Id. at 82, 31 P.3d at 667.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 82-3, 31 P.3d at 667.
147. Id. at 83, 31 P.3d at 667.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. d.at 82, 31 P.3d at 667.
151. Id. at 82-83, 31 P.3d at 667.
152. Supplemental Bief of Petitioner at 3, Kim v. Lee, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 31 P.3d 665 (2001).
255
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March of 1998.151 The title report and policy failed to list Kim's
judgment lien, which had been recorded almost one year earlier.'54
Yakima Title updated the policy in April of 1998 by conducting a second
title search.'55 Although both searches failed to reveal the Kim judgment
lien, 56 an expert witness testified at trial that an ordinary search
disclosed the lien.'57 Because Pioneer National Bank's deed of trust was
assigned to PHH Mortgage Services (PIH), the final title insurance
policy did not issue until July 17, 1998. 5" However, Kim's counsel
informed Yakima Title of Kim's lien prior to the assignment to PHH.'
59
In 1999, Kim's counsel notified PHH and Yakima Title of Kim's
intent to foreclose. 60 Kim then went to the King County Superior Court
and obtained a writ of execution on the Lees' property. 6' Yakima Title
intervened and filed a motion to quash. 62 The court denied the motion
and Yakima Title appealed. 63 The primary question presented to the
Washington Supreme Court was whether the doctrine of equitable
subrogation should be applied to restore the first lien position to PHIH,
the refinance lender, over that of Kim, the intervening creditor."
B. The Washington Supreme Court Adopted the Restatement Rule for
Applying Equitable Subrogation but Failed To Apply the
Restatement Remedy
In Kim, the Washington Supreme Court expressly adopted the
Restatement rule for applying equitable subrogation. 65 However, the
court did not apply the remedy that is an integral element of the rule.




157. Kim v. Lee, 102 Wash. App. 586, 589, 9 P.3d 245, 248 (2000) rev'd, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 31
P.3d 665 (2001).
158. Kim, 145 Wash. 2d at 84, 31 P.3d at 667-68.
159. Id.




164. Id. at 85-86, 31 P.3d at 668. PHH is referred to as the refinance lender for simplicity. PHH is
actually the assignee of the refinance lender.
165. Id. at 89, 31 P.3d at 670.
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Without the proper remedy, Kim resulted in the intervening lienor being
completely protected and the refinance lender being completely
unprotected.
The Restatement rule adopted by the court in Kim allows equitable
subrogation to elevate a refinance lender to first priority but only to the
extent the change in terms does not prejudice junior lienors.1
66
Additionally, equitable subrogation is only possible under the
Restatement when the senior mortgage was recorded prior to the
recording of junior interests. 67 In Kim, the court noted that under the
Restatement rule it adopted, modifications to the senior lien will cause
that lien to lose priority with respect to junior liens but only as to
materially prejudicial changes.16 8 Contrary to the Restatement, the court
also held that actual knowledge on the part of the title insurer bars
equitable subrogation. 69
Having identified the applicable rule of law, the court determined that
there were changes reflected in the refinance loan and that at least one
was prejudicial. With respect to the increase in principal, the court did
not find the change to be significant. 170 Similarly, the court did not find
the decrease in the interest rate to be prejudicial. 71 However, the change
in the term of the loan from six to thirty years was held to materially
prejudice Kim. 2
In addition to finding that Kim was materially prejudiced, the court
held that Yakima Title had actual knowledge of Kim's lien." Actual
knowledge, in the court's opinion, bars equitable subrogation because
any holding otherwise would vitiate the purpose of Washington's
recording statute. 4 Additionally, the court determined that equitable
principles prohibit parties from shifting liability for their negligent acts to





169. Id. at 90-91, 31 P.3d at 671-72.
170. Id. at 87-88, 31 P.3d at 669.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 90, 31 P.3d at 670.




Having found that Yakima Title had actual knowledge of Kim's lien
and that Kim was materially prejudiced by changes in loan terms, the
court reinstated the trial court's judgment that denied Yakima Title's
motion to establish lien priority for PHI-I over Kim.176 With the trial court
judgment reinstated, Kim took first priority and was free to proceed with
the foreclosure and sheriffs sale. 7 7 PHH's expectation of a first priority
lien was neither addressed nor protected.
V. COURTS SHOULD APPLY BIFURCATION BECAUSE IT
BETTER SERVES THE INTERESTS OF EQUITY AND
RESOLVES THE ISSUES OF NOTICE AND NEGLIGENCE
The Washington Supreme Court engaged in an equitable subrogation
analysis in Kim v. Lee and produced an inequitable result.7 8 Courts
should only apply equitable remedies when justice is advanced. 9 Simply
put, the cure should not be worse than the disease. Bifurcation is a better
remedy because it offers predictability, protects both parties' interests,
and is consistent with the principles of equitable subrogation. Bifurcation
also minimizes the inconsistency created when courts deal with notice
and negligence on a case-by-case basis.
A. Bifurcating Priorities Is Consistent with the Principles Behind
Equitable Subrogation and Other Areas of Law, Offers Greater
Predictability, and Protects the Interests of Both Parties
Bifurcation represents a superior solution to priority disputes because
it better serves the principles that justify equitable subrogation and is
consistent with principles reflected in other areas of law. The outcome
created by bifurcation also offers predictability in the resolution of lien
disputes. Moreover, bifurcation allows both parties limited protection
instead of forcing courts to apply the all-or-nothing remedy of equitable
subrogation.
176. Id. at 93, 31 P.3d at 672.
177. See id. at 84-85, 31 P.3d at 668.
178. Id. at 82, 31 P.3d at 666-67. At least part of the inequity created stems from the court
adopting the Restatement's rule for equitable subrogation but failing to apply the recommended
remedy of bifurcation.
179. See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Beesley, 663 A.2d 574, 576 (Me. 1995) (allowing
equitable subrogation when doing so did not prejudice any party's interest and the landowner
misrepresented the nature of his ownership in order to secure the refinance loan).
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1. Bifurcation Serves Equitable Principles and Is Consistent with
Other Legal Principles
Bifurcation not only serves the principles behind equitable
subrogation, it also advances those principles more than equitable
subrogation. The principles behind equitable subrogation include
protecting the refinance lender's justified expectation of first priority and
leaving the intervening lienor in the same position after the remedy is
applied as before the refinance transaction took place. Further, courts
must respect the interests of those with superior rights and equities."'
The advantages of bifurcation with respect to these principles can best be
understood by looking at an example of its application.
Revisiting the introductory example involving Eric and Mark,
bifurcation would protect Bank B's justified expectation of first priority
status up to $145,000, for fifteen years, at an interest rate of eight
percent. These terms represent those in place at the time the refinance
transaction took place, with the exception of the interest rate, which
reflects the better rate Eric obtained.' Because Bank B will receive
limited first priority, its justified expectation of a first priority lien is
protected. At the same time, Mark's position is substantially the same
after bifurcation is applied as before the refinance transaction took place
because the new lien senior to Mark leaves him in approximately the
same position except for the more beneficial loan terms. This outcome
respects the rights and equities of both parties.
In addition to serving equitable principles, bifurcation is consistent
with principles reflected in other areas of the law. For example, courts
give priority to a purchase money security interest (PMSI) in certain
cases and a refinance transaction can be considered a PMSI because the
refinance funds are replacing funds used to purchase the house."'
Bifurcation reflects this principle by giving the refinance lender first
priority. Similarly, bifurcation is also consistent with the legal notion that
a tenant should not be bound by subsequent prejudicial terms negotiated
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. Any lengthening of the term of the loan can be seen as prejudicial to the intervening lienor,
even if the purported justification is to prevent the owner's default. Extending the loan's term slows
the rate at which equity accrues and this could eliminate a judgment lien under the statutory time
limit for such liens. See supra Part I.A, C. Additionally, higher loan-to-value ratios have a positive
correlation with homeowner default and extending the term would slow the rate at which equity
accrues. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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between a landlord and the assignee of the tenant's lease, but is entitled
to enjoy the benefit of more favorable terms. 8 3 Bifurcation reflects this
principle by allowing the intervening lienor to take advantage of more
favorable terms offered by the refinance lender. Beyond these legal
principles, bifurcation also creates predictability for those with interests
in mortgages.
2. Bifurcation Creates Predictability in Lien Disputes
Bifurcation is preferable to equitable subrogation for many reasons,
not the least of which is the increased predictability bifurcation offers.
Because equitable subrogation is an equitable remedy, its application will
differ according to the facts and circumstances of each case.'84 This
makes predicting outcomes particularly difficult. Bifurcation is a
superior remedy because all potential lienors could determine the worst
case scenario in the event of a priority dispute. Refinance lenders would
know that at worst, courts would award them first priority to the extent of
the existing loan terms plus any proposed by the refinance lender that
would be more favorable to an intervening lienor. The intervening lienor
would know the exact terms to which his lien is subordinate by looking
at existing lien terms at the time he records. Equitable subrogation does
not allow potential lenders to predict this risk because the remedy is
applied in widely varying ways and courts' reliance on the circumstances
of each case limits predictability.'85
If courts always applied bifurcation as the remedy for priority disputes
such as the one in Kim, refinance lenders would know that their potential
risk of loss due to an intervening lienor would be limited to the terms of
the existing mortgage. These terms are easily obtained by either asking
the homeowner or by examining the records at the county recorder's
office. This predictability of risk would benefit homeowners as well as
mortgage insurers and secondary mortgage market investors by offering
a known level of risk. Presumably, as risk is identified and minimized,
mortgage insurance premiums will be lowered and additional capital will
be drawn to the secondary mortgage market. Additionally, bifurcation
protects the intervening lienor by offering the same ability to predict loss
from a priority dispute. This predictability may entice lenders to make
183. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
184. See LEAVELL ET AL., supra note 85, at 11-12.
185. See supra notes 82, 100 and accompanying text.
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second priority loans, thereby giving homeowners more financial
flexibility and liquidity of capital.
3. Bifurcation Protects Both Parties and Avoids the Harsh All-or-
Nothing Outcome of Equitable Subrogation
Going back again to the introductory example, bifurcation balances
the rights and equities of Mark and Eric by giving limited relief to both.
Under bifurcation, assuming again that post-judgment interest and
homestead exemptions are not part of the equation, Mark will only need
to wait six years and one month for $50,000 in equity to accrue.'86 If
Mark foreclosed at that point, Bank B would have received
approximately $110,000 in principal and interest payments and would
have a second priority lien for approximately $94,000 against a house
worth $150,000. At the same time, Mark would be able to foreclose a
few months sooner than under the original loan. However, if equitable
subrogation were applied, Mark would have to wait until Eric built up
enough net equity to allow for foreclosure. Under the terms of Eric's new
loan, assuming the value of Eric's home remained the same, Mark will
have to wait over eighteen years for $50,000 in equity to accrue. If post-
judgment interest is factored in, Mark's lien may never be satisfied.'87
Bifurcation, then, respects the rights and equities of both parties by
balancing both parties' need for relief and protection.
Therefore, bifurcation is superior to equitable subrogation because
bifurcation avoids the all-or-nothing remedy of equitable subrogation by
protecting both parties. Under equitable subrogation, either the refinance
lender has a justified expectation protected at the expense of the
intervening lienor's rights under recording laws or the expectation of a
first priority lien by the refinance lender is ignored. Equitable
subrogation also fails to account for the difference in loan terms between
the original loan and the refinance loan. This difference in loan terms
may significantly prejudice the interests of the intervening lienor.
Bifurcation, however, protects the refinance lender's justified
186. The calculations in this section are based on standard amortization tables. Under a
bifurcation approach, the intervening lienor would remain in second priority until, under the terms of
the original lien modified by any more favorable terms, the terms would allow the intervening lienor
to step in and foreclose.
187. Appreciation may not keep up with accruing interest. If simple post-judgment interest of
12% accrued on Mark's lien, when Eric paid off the mortgage in 30 years, Mark's lien would be
valued at $230,000.
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expectation of priority to a limited extent and offers some protection to
the intervening lienor under recording laws. The refinance lender
receives priority to the extent of the original loan and the intervening lien
is accorded some priority based on it having been recorded first.
Bifurcation also accounts for the difference in terms between the original
and refinance loans, leaving the intervening lienor in at least as good of a
position after the remedy as before the refinance transaction.
B. Bifurcating Priorities Allows Parties To Enjoy the Protection of
Notice
Bifurcation maintains the protection created by recording laws.
Recording laws allow those with recorded interests to know with
certainty how their interests relate to other competing interests in the
same property. 8 Subsequent interest holders, with actual or constructive
notice provided by the recording of prior interests, cannot gain priority
over a prior recorded interest. Because equitable subrogation vitiates this
protection, it should be rejected in favor of bifurcation.
1. When Actual Notice Exists, Bifurcation Creates an Equitable
Outcome by Protecting Both Parties
Bifurcation offers a more equitable solution to priority disputes when
the refinance lender has actual notice of an intervening lien. While some
courts make actual notice a bar to equitable subrogation and other courts
favor an analysis based on the refinance lender's intent, courts are still
faced with an all-or-nothing proposition. Bifurcation allows an outcome
that protects both parties.
Where actual notice bars equitable subrogation, courts deny refinance
lenders the benefit of the equitable notion that a lender with a justified
expectation of first priority should receive it."9 Alternatively, if actual
notice does not bar equitable subrogation, courts deny intervening lienors
the protection of recording statutes. 9 Bifurcation ameliorates the
harshness of these extremes by recognizing a limited remedy for the
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See Rush v. Alaska Mortgage Group, 937 P.2d 647, 651 (Alaska 1997) (noting that,
regardless of what a lienor actually knows, it is illogical to release a lien if doing so would prejudice
lienor's interests).
190. See supra Part I.B.
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refinance lender and giving the intervening lienor some protection under
recording laws.
The outcome created by bifurcation is consistent with the
Restatement's view of actual notice. The Restatement suggests that any
form of notice should be immaterial unless there is affirmative proof that
the refinance lender intended to subordinate its mortgage.'91 Bifurcation
supports this view by granting refinance lenders a limited first priority
lien while still providing a disincentive for refinance lenders who might
purposefully choose to disregard title searches in favor of relying on
equitable subrogation.
2. When Constructive Notice Is at Issue, Bifurcation Creates More
Equitable Outcomes Than Equitable Subrogation and Promotes
Stability in the Lending Industry
Bifurcation produces more equitable results when constructive notice
is at issue in the same way it produces more equitable results when actual
notice is at issue; namely, bifurcation offers both parties some protection.
With both parties protected, courts can produce a more fair and moderate
outcome. Additionally, bifurcation allows refinance lenders to predict
risk in the event of a priority dispute due to an intervening lienor. This
ability to predict risk enhances the stability of the mortgage industry and
secondary mortgage market.
Bifurcation is a better remedy than equitable subrogation particularly
when constructive notice exists. When the refinance lender is unaware
that an intervening lien has been recorded, the refinance loan may be
made with a justified expectation of first priority. Conversely, an
intervening lienor with a properly recorded interest should expect the
protection offered by recording laws. The issue of constructive notice
forces courts to decide between giving an intervening lienor the
protection afforded by recording laws, like Washington's "race-notice"
statute, and giving a refinance lender the equitable relief that is available
in many states.'9" As with actual notice, an all-or-nothing priority shift
causes extreme results regardless of how courts decide. Bifurcation
protects both parties by giving the refinance lender a limited first priority
lien and by giving the intervening lienor priority over any prejudicial
change in terms.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1997).
192. See supra Part I.B and note 82.
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The facts in Kim present a case where bifurcation would result in a
more moderate outcome given that, in contrast to the title insurer, the
refinance lender had only constructive knowledge of the intervening lien
at the time of refinancing.'93 Bifurcating the PHH and Kim liens would
have resulted in PHH receiving priority for $130,000 less two years of
payments, at an interest rate of 6.75%, until 2001, when a balloon
payment became due. Kim would have had first priority over the $5,557
that was added to the principal during the refinance and could have
forced a foreclosure sale in 2001 when the original loan became due.
Instead, equitable subrogation would force Kim to wait to foreclose until
the Lees accrue sufficient net equity. 94 Because of the slow rate at which
equity accrues, Kim may have lost the ability to foreclose altogether
given the statutory limit on how long liens on property may exist.
195
While post-judgment interest theoretically compensates Kim for the
delay in collecting his judgment, denying a judgment creditor timely
compensation because of a negligent title search is inequitable and
unjust. Bifurcation would prevent this injustice while minimizing any
burden on the refinance lender, particularly in light of the refinance
lender's ability to predict this risk.
C. Bifurcation Prevents the Inequality and Instability Caused by the
Inconsistent Treatment of Negligence in Applying Equitable
Subrogation
Bifurcation lessens the disparate effects that occur when courts assess
the role of negligence in relation to equitable subrogation. The disparate
treatment of negligence with respect to priority disputes produces
inequality and instability by forcing an all-or-nothing outcome and
destroying predictability in the same way that the disparate treatment of
notice produces those results. Because of its mitigating effect, courts
193. See Kim v. Lee, 145 Wash. 2d 79, 82, 31 P.3d 665, 666-67 (2001). The distinction between
the role of the title insurer and the refinance lender is an important one. See, e.g., id. at 93-94, 31
P.3d at 672-73 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (articulating the different roles Yakima Title and PHH
played in this case). The issue of whether the title insurer's knowledge is attributable to the refinance
lender in equitable subrogation cases has been addressed by at least one other court as well. See
Newberry v. Scruggs, 986 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ark. 1999) (holding that acts of negligent title insurer
are not attributable to refinance lender absent agency relationship).
194. See supra note 35.
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020 (2000).
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should adopt bifurcation to settle priority disputes in the mortgage
context.
Courts have treated the issue of negligence inconsistently when
applying equitable subrogation. Specifically, courts have disagreed on
whether missing a properly recorded intervening lien constitutes an act
sufficiently negligent to bar equitable subrogation. Courts commonly
hold that "culpable negligence" is a bar to the doctrine and define
culpable negligence as behavior that deviates from that of a reasonable
person.19 6 However, courts disagree as to whether missing a properly
recorded lien during a title search constitutes culpable negligence.1 17 This
split on the issue of negligence forces an unjust result regardless of the
decision because the application of equitable subrogation completely
shifts priority in favor of one party or the other despite both having
legitimate claims for priority. Bifurcation offers a more equitable and
predictable solution because courts can grant both parties some relief.
Bifurcation mitigates the inequality caused by courts' treatment of
negligence in equitable subrogation analysis. One view of negligence in
the mortgage context sees an injustice when courts deny an innocent
intervening lienor an elevation in priority as specified under recording
laws because of the fault of another."8 This view suggests that courts
should not impose an equitable remedy when the outcome prejudices
subsequently intervening rights. 9 Conversely, some courts find that
allowing the intervening lienor to step into the first priority position as
required by recording statutes because of another party's mistake results
in a windfall for the intervening lienor.200 Bifurcation ameliorates any
harm caused by a windfall to the intervening lienor by granting limited
priority to the refinance lender. At the same time, courts will not
completely reward the negligence of a title insurance company because
the refinance lender's priority is limited to the terms of the original loan.
The intervening lienor will receive priority over any prejudicial terms
and can gain from any beneficial ones.
196. See, e.g., Newberry, 986 S.W.2d at 858; Smith v. State Say. and Loan Ass'n, 223 Cal. Rptr.
298,301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
197. See supra Part II.C.
198. See Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P'ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1179-80 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001).
199. Id.
200. Brooks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 599 So. 2d 1163,1166 (Ala. 1992).
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Bifurcation results in both more equitable outcomes for the parties and
more stability for the mortgage industry. Because bifurcation has a
limiting effect on the risk refinance lenders and intervening lienors face
due to negligence, more capital may be put into this market. This will
benefit homeowners through lenders competing for the opportunity to
loan money.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bifurcation is a superior alternative to equitable subrogation for
solving lien disputes in the mortgage context. Bifurcation adheres to
equitable principles that equitable subrogation does not and bifurcation
protects both parties' interests while creating predictability for all
concerned parties. With bifurcation, the refinance lender's expectation of
first priority is satisfied to the extent of the original loan terms and the
intervening lienor remains in at least as good of a position after the
remedy is applied as before the refinance transaction occurred. Courts
face an all-or-nothing choice when deciding whether to apply equitable
subrogation, and that choice will result in either an intervening lienor
being denied the protection of recording laws or a refinance lender being
denied the benefit of an equitable remedy. In either case, courts trivialize
legal and equitable rights when they put unnecessary obstacles in the
paths of parties attempting to enforce those rights.2"' The Washington
Supreme Court should adopt bifurcation and reject equitable subrogation
upon review of the next case in which this issue is presented in order to
eliminate obstacles in the paths of those enforcing their rights.
201. See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L. Rev. 163, 167 (1919).
Rights must be paired with remedies that courts will enforce. Id.
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